How much Intersectionality is enough Intersectionality?

At its core, intersectionality is a concept that elucidates the intersection of systems of oppression. When Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the concept in 1989, a key issue for her was not merely that black women are more disadvantaged than white women and black men, but that the nature of their oppression was unique, complex, and irreducible to the aggregate of sexism, racism, and other structures of oppression. The concept has come to be an important tool to describe the intra-action between social structures such as race, gender, class, nation, disability, sexual orientation and age (among others) and how these structures merge to create vehicles of vulnerability [1]. None of these axes operate autonomously and therefore, they cannot be sufficiently analysed or understood as separate dimensions. Analysing social structures in their totality, allows us to understand the oppression of social groups at the nexus of these social structures – the point where these social structures intersect with each other [1].

Several scholars and I worry that pursuing this understanding of intersectionality leads us down a path of particularism. The social structures that have dominated approaches to intersectionality have been the major divisions of race, gender and class while other dimensions of difference such as age, sexuality, geography, dis/ability etc., have received much less attention and continue to be marginalized [2]. ‘Just as how the importance of accounting for relationships between different axis of oppression (particularly race, gender, and class) emerged from black feminists challenging their invisibility in white feminists’ work, disabled feminists have challenged their invisibility in both feminist and disability studies’. In light of these observations, my immediate questions are which social structures should be analysed; why some differences have not been viewed as being equally important; and how many social structures need to be accounted for to meet the ‘requirements’ for intersectionality. It seems reasonable to think that analysing the interactions of differences in religion, geography, educational status, disability, and age, to name a few -in addition to race, gender and class - would more accurately capture individuals’ experiences ‘at the interstices’.

‘Just as how the importance of accounting for relationships between different axis of oppression (particularly race, gender, and class) emerged from black feminists challenging their invisibility in white feminists’ work, disable feminists have challenged their invisibility in both feminist and disability studies’ – Flintoff (2008)

Young (1994) recognised that the concept of intersectionality could lead to a process of regress, that is, analysing social groups to such a specificity that we are analysing individuals instead of social groups [3]. For example, intersectionality requires us to analyse gender from more than just the intersection of race and class, as these structures are not stable enough. Yet, even among people of the same gender, race, and class there are still significant differences and unique forms of oppression. Social structures of normative heterosexuality, social divisions of age, disability, ethnicity and regional specificity among others, merge to form an assemblage of structures to describe extremely specific social positions. This would generate genders or identities “beyond necessity”[4]. If an infinite number of axes of oppression can run through each identity, there is no telling how many social categories there exists. The social categories would lack any analytical utility, they would be too fluid or unstable to be used as a point of analysis.

Because a core premises of intersectionality emphasizes that social structures of oppression cannot be understood in isolation and are constitutive of each other, this would facilitate indefinitely many co-constituting factors that claim intersectional discrimination. How many distinct social categories would need to be acknowledged and adopted into the legal system to ensure the protection of each axis of oppression? Additionally, this implies that everyone experiences unique forms of discrimination, and thus forgoes claims of group-based discrimination. By using this line of reasoning, black women’s experiences of oppression for example, can be said to be disingenuous because class, sexuality, dis/ability and so on are mutually constitutive axis of oppression [5].

De Beco (2017) has noted that the modern emphasis of individualism and particularism has produced anti-discrimination legislation to protect monolithic identities such as women, children, racial minorities, disabled people and so forth. These fixed and stable categories fit neatly into legal definitions and frameworks, however, they overlook and essentialize the multitude of subjectivities across these categories [6]. “These categories are mainly formed on the basis of the most dominant member’s experiences but largely disregard the experiences of the group’s more disadvantaged members” [5]. Similarly, the activities of civil society organizations that focus on particular social groups are often based on the dominant member’s experiences rather than the experiences of sub-groups within these categories.

A possible misinterpretation? Intersectionality is more than Identities

Now, intersectionality does have an explicit anti-essentializing agenda, however, this is not ALL intersectionality is about. In our pursuit to find all the intersecting categories that may oppress an individual or group, we risk making intersectionality an explanation of power differentials and identity formation. Cho, Crenshaw and McCall (2013) refer to this as the “et cetera” problem[7] and Lykke (2011) cautions that an over-focus to include more categories into intersectionality reduces the concept to a “black box” [8]. This indicates an error in critics’ interpretation and use of the concept. Intersectionality (fortunately) is much bigger than analysing social and identity positions. It is certainly more than finding the exact cell in the matrix of social categories.

For Crenshaw, intersectionality is about how identities at the intersect of axes of oppression relate to wider institutional structures and processes that maintain their exclusion and vulnerability. Of equal importance to accounting for the dissimilarities within social categories is the context of these dissimilarities, that is, the power structures that regulate social categories. Social identities and structures need to be understood in the context of expansive “economic, political, and ideological processes, trends, and events” that shape them9. Weber proposes that there is always a “relational character” and a “historical specificity” to social identities. For example, gender is always legitimized by and constitutive of other structural forces (making it a relational character) and it cannot be meaningfully understood without being framed to its wider socio-economic and political context that shapes it [9].

Intersectionality is inseparable from an analysis of power. Chow, Crenshaw & McCall (2013) note that “The recasting of intersectionality as a theory primarily fascinated with the infinite combinations and implications of overlapping identities from an analytic initially concerned with structures of power and exclusion is curious given the explicit references to structures that appear in much of the early work.” [7]. Thus, any critique of intersectionality should interpret the concept as explicitly confronting both identity and power by “reveal[ing] how power works in diffuse and differentiated ways through the creation and deployment of overlapping identity categories” [7].

By emphasizing this ‘relational character’ and ‘historical specificity’ we avoid the tendency to theorize micro and macro levels of analysis as “separate, and almost independent levels”. Brah (1996) and others have proposed that women’s narratives be framed against the interconnected and the constantly changing micro and macro in non-reductive ways.

To help us visualize this ‘relational character’ and ‘historical specificity’ of intersectionality framed against the everchanging micro and macro levels of analysis, McCall (2005) utilized an analytical framework that placed intersectionality on a continuum - creating two dimensions of intersectionality [10]. The first dimension of intersectionality is concerned with subjectivity, to which McCall placed ‘anti-categorical complexity’ that utilizes intersectionality’s anti-essentialist agenda to deconstruct social categories as analytical units. Through this psychoanalytic application, intersectionality was able to resist categorizations in the process of identity formation, and it reflected how individuals are “composed of fragmented identities rather than contributing to a unified experience” [9]. At the other end of the intersectionality continuum McCall placed ‘inter-categorical complexity’ which concerns social identity formation through discourses and power relations. Through this process social inequalities and meanings become embedded into existing hegemonic and institutional power relations, creating possibilities for some and excluding possibilities for others.

Both ends of the continuum have theoretical restrictions. “While anti-categorical complexity may overemphasize the individual and consequently mitigate the wider effects of structural discourses, inter-categorical analysis makes it difficult to understand the daily lived experiences of women from a top-down approach” [9]. This has implications for how we are able to theorize the lived experiences of subordinated individuals.

Intra-categorical complexity sits between the two ends of the intersectional spectrum and offers an analytical exit to the regress problem. This approach recognizes the individual as the ‘unity of identities’ and that the individuals situate themselves at “a set of intersecting social relations” [9]. So, while a Black South African, homosexual and disabled women is situated at the intersection of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and disability, at any instance (time and space) some of these categories, and not others, would be more central to her being. The performance of identities is situational. Intra-categorical complexity views the individual experiences of identity emphasised in anti-categorical complexity and the exclusionary ramifications of discursive connotations of difference emphasised by inter-categorical complexity as one relational process, inseparable from one another. Individuals’ identities cannot be separated from the discourses that shape their lived experiences and how they reflect upon those experiences. Through intra-categorical complexity we can begin to see the interplay between the social constructions (at the macro level) and the social psychological (at the micro level) by recognizing “the dialectical relationship between discourse and the individual as a continuing and relational process” [9]. An intra-categorical analysis simultaneously examines how discourses and discursive categories are constructed, re-constructed, and contested in the public space and how such discourses and discursive categories are experienced and resisted in individuals’ everyday lives.

Insert Chanel logo.

McCall’s intra-complexity analysis provides us with a theoretical framework to escape particularism by interrogating between both ends of the intersectional continuum. It is at the centre, at the Vesica Piscis that we are able to grasp what intersectionality does, rather than what it is. The Vesica Piscis is an artifact of sacred geometry made up of two identical intersecting circles, in which the centre of each circle lies at the perimeter of the other [11]. This forms a simple yet ingenious figure that aptly has no end or beginning. Identities are not stagnant or stable objects, they are always multiple, fragmented and are constructed and contested across a web of intersecting and often contested discourses, practices, and positions [12]. Interpreting intersectionality from this midpoint allows us to account for the fragmented and fluctuating dimensions of identity within the artificially constructed social categories and the systems injustice that sustain them [6].

We are encouraged to focus on both the articulation of discourses at the structural level and the processes in which discourses shape the sense of self. Just as Frank Ocean baritones over a bass piano while observing how “[He] sees both sides like Chanel”, McCall’s intra-complexity analysis emphasizes that both sides of the intersectionality continuum can be simultaneously engaged. Attention to identity need not obscure us from confronting political and structural inequalities. It is necessary to focus on both the articulation of discourses at the structural level and the process in which discourses shape social groups [9]. Intersectionality can help to reveal how power operates in differentiated ways to create overlapping identity categories. As Chun, Lipsitz, & Shin (2013) shrewdly observe, “Intersectionality primarily concerns the way things work rather than who people are” [7].

It is crucial that we shift away from interpretations of intersectionality as “descriptions of positionality”9 and an exclusive priority on accounting for differences. Tomlinson (2013) argues that this would obstruct us from seeing “which differences make a difference. Yet it is exactly our analyses of power that reveal which differences carry significance” [7].

Intersectionality as an Analytical Framework:

Considering what has been discussed above, rather than an explicit use of intersectionality as a general concept, some scholars have suggested it is better suited as an analytical tool (Collins & Bilge, 2016) or a regulative ideal (Gasdaglis & Madva, 2019). It is much better when used as an  approach to thinking and analysing problems of sameness and difference in relation to power dynamics and inequality. Its disposition to guide conceiving social categories as mutually constitutive, fluid, evolving, produced, and contested through dynamics of power frames what intersectionality does and makes it suitable as a heuristic tool [13].

“by itself, intersectionality provides neither any structural analyses of oppressions and privileges nor any particular analysis of anyone’s complex identity or experiences. Instead it points out what kinds of analyses might be useful, namely, ones that consider mutually constructed or intermeshed axes of oppression or facets of identities…. Intersectionality helps to point us to fruitful and complex marginalized locations. It does not do the work for us, but tells us where to start and suggests kinds of questions to ask.” [13] (Garry, 2011)

One of the ways this can be used as a heuristic tool to apply intersectionality has been well articulated by Mari Matsuda:

“The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is through a method I call ‘ask the other question.’ When I see something that looks racist, I ask, “Where is the patriarchy in this?” When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, “Where is the heterosexism in this?” When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, “Where are the class interests in this?” Working in coalition forces us to look for both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of domination, helping us to realize that no form of subordination ever stands alone.” (Mari Matsuda, 1991: 1189: Where is Your Body? and Other Essays on Race, Gender and the Law)

As a regulative ideal, Gasdaglis & Madva (2019), propose that firstly, intersectionality should treat “existing classification schemes as if they are indefinitely mutually informing”. This would guide an empirical analysis of difference and similarity across social identities. Intersectionality from this perspective helps us understand how certain ‘in between’ experiences and social categories can be mutually informing and uncover inter-group similarities in regard to the needs of the situation [13]. Secondly, intersectionality as a regulative ideal is to be “explicitly and essentially political”, it should refer our theoretical and practical scrutiny back to understanding and resisting injustices, the formation of identities and experiences, the production of social institutions, marginalization in the context of political discourse, and discursive practices.

Conclusion

Analysing difference among social groups and attempting to account for all possible axes of oppression has been a misinterpretation of intersectionality anti-essentializing agenda. This interpretation has been removed from an equal focus of the wider socio-economic and political processes that enable discrimination and other forms of injustice. Intersectionality was never meant to have a vague stopping point for indefinitely many axes of oppression (and thus finding some reified and stable identity). Rather Kimberlé Crenshaw hoped for it to be an empirical analysis of power differentials, identity formations and how social categories are intertwined in constantly changing context. For this reason, depicting the concept as an analytical framework, as opposed to a general law, allows us to use approaches from any discipline to ensure the relational quality between identity and

Intersectionality should serve as a heuristic tool, guiding us through the interconnections of oppression and a means to uncover and challenge systemic inequalities. It encourages us to analyze the ways in which social categories are mutually constitutive, fluid, and contested through power dynamics. By employing an intra-categorical complexity approach, we can explore the relational processes between discourses and individuals' lived experiences, while avoiding the pitfalls of particularism. Intersectionality, when understood in its true form, helps us understand the complexity of marginalized positions and highlights the need for structural analyses of oppressions and privileges.

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Work Cited

1             Weldon, S. L. Intersectionality. Politics, Gender and Concepts: Theory and Methodology, ed. Gary Goertz and Amy G. Mazur, 193-218 (2008).

2             Flintoff, A., Fitzgerald, H. & Scraton, S. The challenges of intersectionality: Researching difference in physical education. International Studies in Sociology of Education 18, 73-85 (2008).

3             Young, I. M. Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 19, 713 - 738 (1994).

4             Bailey, A. On intersectionality, empathy, and feminist solidarity: A reply to Naomi Zack. Journal for Peace and Justice Studies 19, 14-36 (2009).

5             Gasdaglis, K. & Madva, A. Intersectionality as a regulative ideal. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6 (2019).

6             De Beco, G. Protecting the invisible: an intersectional approach to international human rights law. Human Rights Law Review 17, 633-663 (2017).

7             Cho, S., Crenshaw, K. W. & McCall, L. Toward a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applications, and praxis. Signs: Journal of women in culture and society 38, 785-810 (2013).

8             Lykke, N. Intersectional analysis: Black box or useful critical feminist thinking technology.  (2011).

9             Chow, P. Y. S. Has intersectionality reached its limits? Intersectionality in the UN human rights treaty body practice and the issue of ambivalence. Human Rights Law Review 16, 453-481 (2016).

10           McCall, L. The complexity of intersectionality. Signs: Journal of women in culture and society 30, 1771-1800 (2005).

11           Barrallo, J., González-Quintial, F. & Sánchez-Beitia, S. An Introduction to the Vesica Piscis, the Reuleaux Triangle and Related Geometric Constructions in Modern Architecture. Nexus Network Journal 17, 671-684 (2015). https://doi.org:10.1007/s00004-015-0253-9

12           Verkuyten, M. The social psychology of ethnic identity.  (Psychology Press, 2004).

13           Garry, A. Intersectionality, metaphors, and the multiplicity of gender. Hypatia 26, 826-850 (2011).